A complaint under Section 195 CrPC for the offence of disobeying an order of a public servant (Section 188 IPC) does not satisfy the separate statutory requirements for prosecution under Section 60 of the Disaster Management Act or Section 467(a) of the DMC Act, which need a complaint by specified authorities. A court should check these conditions before taking cognizance of such offences. At the quashing stage, the High Court does not decide whether work was mere repair or construction, or whether the accused knew her act could spread infection, and leaves these questions to the trial court.
The Delhi High Court has refused to quash a COVID-lockdown case against a Chandni Chowk property owner, but has sent two of the charges back to the trial court, since it is not clear whether the legally required complaints for them were ever filed.
Smt. Manju Dalmia bought the second floor and roof rights of a Katra Shahenshahi building and said that she had been told by the municipal corporation that no permit was needed for permissible repairs. On 6 April 2021, the SHO flagged unauthorised construction, and the North MCD issued a work-stop notice on 8 April. On 28 April 2021, during Delhi’s complete lockdown (19 April to 3 May), a patrolling ASI allegedly found labourers working at the property. An FIR was registered under Sections 188, 269 and 34 IPC, Section 344 of the DMC Act and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, and a charge-sheet was filed. She argued that it was only routine repair, that the common intention under Section 34 and mens rea were missing, that the DDMA notification allowed some repair services, and that the offences were minor and pandemic-related, relying on Priya Narang. Justice Madhu Jain accepted that the High Court’s power to quash is used sparingly, and that at this stage the court does not decide the truth of allegations. She did not quash the cases under Section 188 IPC, since a complaint from the ACP, as required by Section 195 CrPC, was obtained, or under Section 269 IPC, since engaging labourers during the lockdown may prima facie amount to a negligent act likely to spread infection, which depends on evidence. But the record did not show whether the separate complaint needed under Section 60 of the Disaster Management Act was filed, or whether a Deputy Commissioner-level officer or higher made the complaint required by Section 467(a) of the DMC Act for the Section 344 charge. These requirements are distinct from Section 195 CrPC. The court therefore sent back the Section 51 DM Act and Section 344(1) DMC Act charges, and asked the trial court to examine the original complaints and the authority of the complainants. It must also decide whether the work needed municipal sanction and pass a fresh speaking order on cognizance.
Note: The court has not decided that the petitioner is guilty, and its remarks are confined to this petition. It also did not decide whether the work was only repair or construction. It left the Section 188 and 269 IPC proceedings to continue, and sent only the other two charges back for fresh examination. The judgment says that Priya Narang was distinguished, but does not explain how.
Citation: Smt. Manju Dalmia v. State of NCT of Delhi, CRL.M.C. 2164/2025 (with Crl.M.A. 9791/2025), Delhi High Court (Justice Madhu Jain), decided on 15.10.2026 | 2026:DHC:9160
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